2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
The analysis of middle powers and the developmental predicament of the “bottom billion” requires a multidimensional conceptual and theoretical grounding that integrates insights from international relations theory, development economics, and global governance studies. This section clarifies the key concepts underpinning the study and situates them within relevant theoretical traditions.
2.1. Conceptualising Middle Powers
The concept of middle powers has undergone significant transformation within the field of international relations, evolving from a narrow, capability-based definition to a more nuanced, behaviourally oriented framework. Early understandings of middle powers were rooted in material indicators such as gross domestic product, military capacity, population size, and industrial output. Within this traditional hierarchy, middle powers were positioned between dominant great powers—such as the United States—and smaller, less influential states
| [28] | Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R., & Nossal, K. (1993). Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order. UBC Press. |
| [55] | Holbraad, C. (1984). Middle powers in international politics. Macmillan. |
| [61] | Jordaan, E. (2003). The concept of a middle power in international relations. Politikon, 30(2), 165–181.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0258934032000147282 |
| [65] | Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press. |
[28, 55, 61, 65]
. This materialist perspective conceptualised middle powers as states with moderate but not decisive capabilities, capable of limited regional or issue-specific influence but lacking the capacity to shape the global system independently
| [14] | Baldwin, D. A. (2016). Power and international relations: A conceptual approach. Princeton University Press. |
| [79] | Nolte, D. (2010). How to compare regional powers. Review of International Studies, 36(4), 881–901.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000103 |
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However, this capability-based conception has been widely critiqued for its inability to adequately explain the diverse roles middle powers play in contemporary geopolitics. Scholars have argued that material indicators alone fail to capture the strategic agency, diplomatic behaviour, and institutional engagement that define middle power influence
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [75] | Narlikar, A. (2013). Rising powers: Emerging economies in global governance. Oxford University Press. |
[4, 27, 75]
. As a result, contemporary scholarship has shifted towards a behavioural and functional interpretation of middle power status, emphasising how states act rather than merely what they possess
| [52] | Hampson, F. O., & Heinbecker, P. (2011). The “new” middle powers: International relations theory and practice. International Journal, 66(2), 299–315. |
| [73] | Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations. Palgrave Macmillan. |
[52, 73]
. From this behavioural perspective, middle powers are characterised by their commitment to multilateralism, active participation in international institutions, and reliance on diplomatic and cooperative strategies rather than coercion
| [58] | Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order. Princeton University Press. |
| [65] | Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press. |
| [100] | Ruggie, J. G. (1998). Constructing the world polity. International Organization, 52(4), 855–885.
https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
[58, 65, 100]
. As Robert Keohane argues, states that lack hegemonic dominance often depend on international institutions to extend their influence and secure their interests. This argument, central to liberal institutionalism, posits that cooperation through institutions can mitigate the anarchic nature of the international system and enable states with limited material power to exercise meaningful influence
| [51] | Hale, T., Held, D., & Young, K. (2013). Gridlock: Why global cooperation is failing. Polity Press. |
| [57] | Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
| [65] | Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press. |
[51, 57, 65]
.
In practice, middle powers utilise platforms such as the United Nations to amplify their voices, shape global norms, and influence policy outcomes. Through coalition-building, agenda-setting, and diplomatic brokerage, they are able to exert influence that often exceeds their material capabilities
| [18] | Björkdahl, A. (2008). Norm advocacy: A small state strategy. Journal of International Relations and Development, 11(2), 135–154. |
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
[18, 27]
. This institutional engagement enables middle powers to function as intermediaries between great powers and smaller states, fostering dialogue, reducing tensions, and promoting consensus on complex global issues
| [16] | Bercovitch, J., & Jackson, R. (2009). Conflict resolution in the twenty-first century. University of Michigan Press. |
| [60] | Ingebritsen, C. (2002). Norm entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s role in world politics. Cooperation and Conflict, 37(1), 11–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836702037001002 |
[16, 60]
. Their reliance on rules-based frameworks also reflects a strategic interest in maintaining a stable and predictable international order in which their relative influence can be maximised
| [59] | Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7–23.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241 |
| [100] | Ruggie, J. G. (1998). Constructing the world polity. International Organization, 52(4), 855–885.
https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
| [119] | Zürn, M. (2018). A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation. Oxford University Press. |
[59, 100, 119]
. Furthermore, middle powers are frequently conceptualised as “system stabilisers,” contributing to the maintenance and reinforcement of a rules-based international system
| [30] | Cox, R. W. (1989). Production, power, and world order: Social forces in the making of history. Columbia University Press. |
| [57] | Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
[30, 57]
. Unlike great powers, which may seek to reshape global structures to reflect their dominance, middle powers tend to support existing institutions and norms, viewing them as essential mechanisms for preserving order and predictability
| [5] | Acharya, A. (2018). Constructing global order: Agency and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press. |
| [87] | Patrick, S. (2017). The sovereignty wars. Oxford University Press. |
[5, 87]
. Their diplomatic activism is often selective and issue-specific, focusing on areas where they possess comparative advantages or normative leadership
| [46] | Flemes, D. (2010). Regional leadership in the global system. GIGA Working Papers. |
| [53] | Higgott, R., & Cooper, A. F. (1990). Issues in global governance. Harvester Wheatsheaf. |
| [61] | Jordaan, E. (2003). The concept of a middle power in international relations. Politikon, 30(2), 165–181.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0258934032000147282 |
[46, 53, 61]
. These areas commonly include climate governance, conflict mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and development cooperation
| [63] | Karlsrud, J. (2019). United Nations peacekeeping and legitimacy. Palgrave Macmillan. |
| [108] | Thakur, R. (2016). The responsibility to protect: Norms, laws and the third world. Cambridge University Press. |
| [112] | Viola, E., & Franchini, M. (2018). Brazil and climate governance. Routledge. |
[63, 108, 112]
.
For example, middle powers have played critical roles in advancing international climate agreements, supporting multilateral peace operations, and promoting human rights norms through institutional channels
| [45] | Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
| [54] | Hochstetler, K., & Milkoreit, M. (2015). Emerging powers in climate negotiations: Shifting identity conceptions. Political Research Quarterly, 68(1), 224–235.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914560751 |
[45, 54]
. Their contributions often involve norm entrepreneurship—the process of shaping, promoting, and institutionalising new standards of behaviour in global politics
| [22] | Checkel, J. T. (2005). International institutions and socialization in Europe. International Organization, 59(4), 801–826. |
| [117] | Wiener, A. (2014). A theory of contestation. Springer. |
[22, 117]
. Through such efforts, middle powers influence not only policy outcomes but also the normative architecture of the international system
| [3] | Acharya, A. (2014a). The end of American world order. Polity Press. |
| [119] | Zürn, M. (2018). A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation. Oxford University Press. |
[3, 119]
. This functional approach highlights the distinctive niche occupied by middle powers within the global hierarchy. While great powers rely heavily on hard power instruments such as military force and economic coercion, middle powers prioritise soft power strategies, including persuasion, legitimacy, and coalition-building
| [73] | Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations. Palgrave Macmillan. |
| [82] | Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs. |
| [83] | Nye, J. S. (2011). The future of power. PublicAffairs. |
[73, 82, 83]
. Their influence derives from credibility, diplomatic skill, and the ability to mobilise collective action rather than from unilateral dominance
| [14] | Baldwin, D. A. (2016). Power and international relations: A conceptual approach. Princeton University Press. |
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
[14, 27]
. At the same time, they differ from small states, which often lack the institutional capacity, resources, and diplomatic networks required for sustained engagement in global governance
.
Importantly, the contemporary understanding of middle powers also reflects the changing nature of global power distribution in an increasingly multipolar world. The rise of emerging economies such as Brazil, India, and South Africa has blurred traditional distinctions between middle and great powers, creating a more fluid and dynamic hierarchy
| [75] | Narlikar, A. (2013). Rising powers: Emerging economies in global governance. Oxford University Press. |
| [107] | Stuenkel, O. (2015). The BRICS and the future of global order. Lexington Books. |
[75, 107]
. These states often combine elements of both categories, exercising regional leadership while simultaneously engaging in global governance
| [8] | Alden, C., & Vieira, M. A. (2005). The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism. Third World Quarterly, 26(7), 1077–1095.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500235631 |
| [11] | Armijo, L. E. (2007). The BRICS countries as analytical category: Mirage or insight? Asian Perspective, 31(4), 7–42. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2007.0014 |
| [92] | Ravenhill, J. (1998). Middle power activism. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52(3), 309–327.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357719808445259 |
[8, 11, 92]
. Their participation in groupings such as BRICS further illustrates how middle powers can collectively enhance their influence and challenge established power structures
| [67] | Kirton, J. J. (2016). G20 governance. Routledge. |
| [72] | Mawdsley, E. (2019). South–South cooperation 2.0? The role of the Global South in development cooperation. Routledge. |
[67, 72]
. Recent scholarship also emphasises the role of middle powers in addressing transnational challenges such as climate change, global health crises, and digital governance
| [1] | Aaronson, S. A. (2021). Data is different: Why the world needs a new approach to governing cross-border data flows. CIGI. |
| [34] | Drezner, D. W. (2021). The song remains the same: International relations after COVID 19. Princeton University Press. |
| [42] | Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape power. International Security, 44(1), 42–79.
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351 |
[1, 34, 42]
. In these domains, middle powers often act as innovators and coalition-builders, leveraging their flexibility and diplomatic networks to facilitate cooperation among diverse actors
| [51] | Hale, T., Held, D., & Young, K. (2013). Gridlock: Why global cooperation is failing. Polity Press. |
| [119] | Zürn, M. (2018). A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation. Oxford University Press. |
[51, 119]
. Their ability to navigate complex interdependencies and bridge competing interests underscores their continued relevance in contemporary international relations
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [66] | Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2012). Power and interdependence (4th ed.). Longman. |
[4, 66]
.
Moreover, the behavioural conception of middle powers underscores the importance of agency and strategy in shaping international outcomes. Rather than being defined solely by structural position, middle powers actively construct their roles through foreign policy choices, institutional engagement, and normative leadership
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [52] | Hampson, F. O., & Heinbecker, P. (2011). The “new” middle powers: International relations theory and practice. International Journal, 66(2), 299–315. |
[27, 52]
. This perspective aligns with constructivist approaches, which emphasise the role of ideas, identities, and norms in shaping state behaviour
| [22] | Checkel, J. T. (2005). International institutions and socialization in Europe. International Organization, 59(4), 801–826. |
| [45] | Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
[22, 45]
. The conceptualisation of middle powers has evolved from a static, capability-based framework to a dynamic, behaviour-oriented understanding that emphasises agency, strategy, and institutional engagement. While material capabilities remain relevant, they are no longer sufficient to define middle power status. Instead, contemporary scholarship highlights the importance of multilateralism, norm entrepreneurship, and diplomatic activism in shaping the roles and influence of middle powers. This evolution reflects broader changes in the international system, including the rise of multipolarity, the increasing importance of global governance, and the growing complexity of transnational challenges. As such, middle powers occupy a distinctive and indispensable niche within the global order, acting as mediators, stabilisers, and innovators in an increasingly interconnected and uncertain world
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [66] | Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2012). Power and interdependence (4th ed.). Longman. |
| [75] | Narlikar, A. (2013). Rising powers: Emerging economies in global governance. Oxford University Press. |
| [119] | Zürn, M. (2018). A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation. Oxford University Press. |
[4, 66, 75, 119]
.
2.2. Theoretical Foundations: Soft Power and Constructivism
A central theoretical lens for understanding the influence of middle powers in contemporary geopolitics is the concept of soft power, developed by Joseph Nye. Soft power refers to the ability of a state to shape the preferences, attitudes, and behaviour of other actors through attraction, persuasion, and legitimacy rather than coercion or material inducement
| [82] | Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs. |
| [83] | Nye, J. S. (2011). The future of power. PublicAffairs. |
[82, 83]
. Unlike hard power, which relies on military force or economic sanctions, soft power is rooted in intangible resources such as culture, political values, and foreign policy credibility. For middle powers, which typically lack overwhelming material capabilities, soft power becomes an essential instrument for exerting international influence. Middle powers frequently deploy soft power through a variety of channels, including cultural diplomacy, development assistance, peacekeeping, and advocacy for international norms. By projecting an image of legitimacy and moral authority, they are able to build trust and foster cooperation among diverse actors. For example, their commitment to multilateralism and international law enhances their credibility within global institutions, enabling them to influence policy outcomes beyond what their material power alone would permit
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [73] | Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations. Palgrave Macmillan. |
[27, 73]
. In this sense, soft power serves as both a strategic resource and a compensatory mechanism, allowing middle powers to navigate a system dominated by larger states.
Closely related to the concept of soft power is the constructivist perspective in international relations, which emphasises the role of ideas, norms, identities, and social interactions in shaping state behaviour. Constructivism challenges the assumptions of purely materialist theories, such as realism, by arguing that the international system is socially constructed rather than objectively given. Scholars such as Alexander Wendt assert that “anarchy is what states make of it,” highlighting the importance of shared meanings and collective understandings in determining how states interact
| [115] | Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391–425. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764 |
| [116] | Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press. |
[115, 116]
. From a constructivist standpoint, middle powers are not merely passive actors constrained by their material limitations; rather, they actively participate in shaping the normative structure of the international system. Through sustained engagement in multilateral institutions, they contribute to the creation, diffusion, and institutionalisation of global norms, particularly in areas such as human rights, environmental governance, and sustainable development
. Their influence is therefore exercised not only through policy outcomes but also through the framing of global agendas and the establishment of acceptable standards of behaviour.
In this regard, institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations function as more than mere arenas for negotiation. They serve as critical sites for norm creation, socialisation, and reinforcement. Middle powers utilise these platforms to advocate for rules-based governance, promote equitable policies, and build coalitions around shared values. By doing so, they are able to project influence that is disproportionate to their material capabilities, reinforcing their role as norm entrepreneurs and facilitators of international cooperation
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [100] | Ruggie, J. G. (1998). Constructing the world polity. International Organization, 52(4), 855–885.
https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
[4, 100]
. Moreover, the interplay between soft power and constructivist dynamics underscores the importance of legitimacy in global politics. Middle powers often derive their influence from being perceived as impartial, cooperative, and committed to collective goods. This perception enhances their ability to mediate conflicts, broker agreements, and shape international discourse. It also distinguishes them from great powers, whose actions may be viewed with suspicion due to their strategic interests and coercive capabilities. In sum, the integration of soft power theory and constructivist insights provides a robust framework for understanding the unique role of middle powers in global politics. By leveraging attraction, legitimacy, and normative influence, middle powers are able to transcend their material constraints and contribute meaningfully to the governance and evolution of the international system.
2.3. The Bottom Billion: A Developmental Framework
The concept of the “bottom billion,” popularised by Paul Collier, identifies a group of countries where extreme poverty and development failure are persistent rather than transitory phenomena
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
[25]
. This framework foregrounds the structural and self reinforcing nature of underdevelopment, arguing that simply increasing economic growth is insufficient without addressing systemic constraints (Collier, 2007; Sachs, 2005). According to Collier, roughly one billion people live in states trapped in cycles of conflict, weak governance, and economic stagnation. Collier’s model identifies four principal “traps” that impede progress: the conflict trap, the natural resource trap, the landlocked with bad neighbours trap, and the bad governance trap
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [26] | Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563–595.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064 |
[25, 26]
. The conflict trap describes the mutually reinforcing relationship between poverty and civil war, where low income increases the likelihood of war, and conflict undermines institutions and investment
| [26] | Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563–595.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064 |
| [44] | Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review, 97(1), 75–90. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000534 |
[26, 44]
. The natural resource trap—often termed the resource curse—suggests that resource dependence generates rent seeking, corruption, and volatility that hinder diversified development
| [12] | Auty, R. M. (1993). Sustaining development in mineral economies: The resource curse thesis. Routledge. |
| [99] | Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government. Cambridge University Press. |
| [102] | Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). Resource curse. European Economic Review, 45(4–6), 827–838.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8 |
[12, 99, 102]
. The landlocked trap highlights the persistent disadvantages of geographically isolated economies burdened by transport costs and reliance on neighbours with weak infrastructure or governance
. Finally, the bad governance trap underscores how weak institutions, corruption, and political instability systematically reduce economic incentives and social trust
| [2] | Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown Business. |
| [38] | Easterly, W. (2006). The white man’s burden. Penguin Press. |
| [80] | North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change. Cambridge University Press. |
[2, 38, 80]
.
From a theoretical perspective, the bottom billion framework aligns with structuralist interpretations of development, emphasising how global economic structures and power relations shape opportunities for peripheral economies
| [21] | Cardoso, F. H., & Faletto, E. (1979). Dependency and development in Latin America. University of California Press. |
| [90] | Prebisch, R. (1950). Economic development of Latin America. United Nations. |
[21, 90]
. Structuralism posits that unequal exchange and global market hierarchies systematically disadvantage producers in the periphery, limiting their capacity for autonomous growth (Frank, 1967; Amin, 1974). This view is echoed by Rodney Walter, who critiques the historical legacy of colonialism in embedding patterns of economic dependency
. In addition, dependency theorists argue that the integration of the bottom billion into global markets often reinforces inequality rather than eroding it
| [21] | Cardoso, F. H., & Faletto, E. (1979). Dependency and development in Latin America. University of California Press. |
| [31] | Dos Santos, T. (1970). The structure of dependence. American Economic Review, 60(2), 231–236. |
[21, 31]
. Here, global capitalism is seen as a system where core states accumulate surplus at the expense of the periphery, making peripheral countries vulnerable to external shocks
| [41] | Evans, P. (1979). Dependent development. Princeton University Press. |
| [114] | Wallerstein, I. (1974). The modern world-system. Academic Press. |
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.
At the same time, the bottom billion thesis resonates with institutionalist perspectives that underscore the centrality of governance and political structures in shaping development outcomes
| [2] | Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown Business. |
| [80] | North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change. Cambridge University Press. |
[2, 80]
. Weak institutions—not merely weak markets—are increasingly recognised as core impediments in fragile states (Kufour, 2000; Doner et al., 2005). Corruption reduces the effectiveness of public investment, undermines rule of law, and erodes trust in the state
| [88] | Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (2013). Political economics. MIT Press. |
| [89] | Power, M., Mohan, G., & Tan-Mullins, M. (2012). China’s resource diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan. |
| [99] | Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government. Cambridge University Press. |
[88, 89, 99]
. Political instability limits long term planning and investment, reinforcing cycles of poverty and exclusion
| [26] | Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563–595.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064 |
| [50] | Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (1995). The political economy of democratic transitions. Princeton University Press. |
[26, 50]
. The bottom billion framework also intersects with geopolitical and historical political economy critiques. As Rupert Smith and Anthony Dowden argue, the legacy of conflict, colonialism, and foreign intervention deeply shapes state capacity and patterns of development in Africa and parts of Asia
| [32] | Dowden, R. (2008). Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. Portobello Books. |
[32]
. Dowden’s work highlights how the colonial extraction model left enduring institutional distortions that continue to disadvantage many bottom billion states
| [32] | Dowden, R. (2008). Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. Portobello Books. |
[32]
. Similarly, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson emphasise that institutional inclusivity is a necessary condition for sustainable economic development
| [2] | Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown Business. |
[2]
.
Importantly, the bottom billion framework underscores that development is not simply an economic variable but a political process shaped by internal and external governance environments (Sen, 1999; Easterly, 2006). Public policy choices—such as investment in health, education, and infrastructure—are mediated by political institutions, social coalitions, and fiscal capacity (Rodrik, 2007; Collier, 2007). External structures matter as well. International financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have sought to address these traps through lending and conditionality, but critics argue that standardised policy prescriptions often overlook local contexts and governance realities
| [37] | Easterly, W. (2001). The elusive quest for growth. MIT Press. |
| [106] | Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. W. W. Norton & Company. |
[37, 106]
. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala emphasises that without internally driven reforms—such as strengthening domestic accountability, tax systems, and institutional transparency—external support alone cannot overcome development impediments
| [84] | Okonjo-Iweala, N. (2007). Reforming the unreformable. MIT Press. |
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
[84, 85]
.
Moreover, scholars such as Amartya Sen argue that capabilities—freedom to participate in economic and political life—are as important as income in defining development
| [104] | Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford University Press. |
[104]
. This aligns with human centred approaches that stress education, health, and human rights as integral to long term growth (UNDP, 1990; Nussbaum, 2011). In sum, the bottom billion framework integrates structuralist, institutionalist, historical, and human development perspectives to explain why poverty persists in specific populations despite global economic growth. Understanding these traps is essential for designing development strategies that address both external constraints and internal governance deficits—an understanding that informs the role that middle powers might play in supporting inclusive development in the world’s most vulnerable regions.
2.4. Linking Middle Powers to Development Theory
The intersection between middle power theory and development studies has become increasingly salient in contemporary international relations, particularly in the context of shifting global economic power and the emergence of alternative development paradigms. Middle powers—states that possess moderate material capabilities but exert disproportionate influence through diplomacy, coalition-building, and norm entrepreneurship—occupy a strategic position within the global development architecture
| [55] | Holbraad, C. (1984). Middle powers in international politics. Macmillan. |
| [61] | Jordaan, E. (2003). The concept of a middle power in international relations. Politikon, 30(2), 165–181.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0258934032000147282 |
| [92] | Ravenhill, J. (1998). Middle power activism. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52(3), 309–327.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357719808445259 |
| [93] | Roberts, C., Armijo, L. E., & Katada, S. N. (2018). The BRICS and collective financial statecraft. Oxford University Press. |
[55, 61, 92, 93]
. Their hybrid status enables them to function simultaneously as recipients and providers of development assistance, thereby creating a unique bridge between the Global North and the Global South
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [78] | Nel, P. (2010). Redistribution and recognition. Review of International Studies, 36(4), 951–974. |
[27, 78]
. This dual identity aligns closely with the principles of development theory, particularly dependency theory and post-development approaches, which critique the hierarchical nature of traditional North–South relations
| [39] | Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering development. Princeton University Press. |
[39]
. Middle powers challenge these asymmetries by promoting horizontal partnerships through South–South cooperation frameworks. Such cooperation emphasizes mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, and context-specific development strategies, diverging from the conditionalities often associated with Western-led aid regimes
| [24] | Chin, G. T., & Quadir, F. (2012). Rising states, rising donors and the global aid regime. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25(4), 493–506.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2012.744639 |
| [72] | Mawdsley, E. (2019). South–South cooperation 2.0? The role of the Global South in development cooperation. Routledge. |
[24, 72]
.
A prominent manifestation of this dynamic is seen in multilateral groupings such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which exemplify the growing agency of emerging economies in reshaping global development discourse
| [92] | Ravenhill, J. (1998). Middle power activism. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52(3), 309–327.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357719808445259 |
| [107] | Stuenkel, O. (2015). The BRICS and the future of global order. Lexington Books. |
[92, 107]
. Through initiatives such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), BRICS countries have created alternative financial mechanisms that challenge the dominance of Bretton Woods institutions
| [49] | Griffith-Jones, S. (2014). A BRICS development bank. UNCTAD Discussion Papers. |
| [56] | Humphrey, C. (2017). The New Development Bank. ODI. |
[49, 56]
. These institutions prioritize infrastructure development, sustainable financing, and reduced dependency on Western capital markets, thereby offering new pathways for economic transformation in developing countries
| [23] | Cheru, F., & Obi, C. (Eds.). (2010). The rise of China and India in Africa. Zed Books. |
| [47] | Gallagher, K. P. (2016). The China triangle. Oxford University Press. |
[23, 47]
.
Middle powers’ involvement in such frameworks reflects a broader shift toward multipolarity in global governance. Unlike traditional great powers, middle powers often emphasize inclusive multilateralism and norm-based diplomacy, advocating for reforms that enhance the representation of developing countries in international institutions
| [29] | Cooper, A. F., & Thakur, R. (2013). The Group of Twenty (G20). Routledge. |
| [75] | Narlikar, A. (2013). Rising powers: Emerging economies in global governance. Oxford University Press. |
[29, 75]
. For instance, countries such as India, Brazil, and South Africa have consistently called for restructuring voting rights within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to better reflect contemporary economic realities
. These efforts align with development theories that emphasize equity, participation, and institutional legitimacy
| [104] | Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford University Press. |
| [106] | Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. W. W. Norton & Company. |
[104, 106]
. Furthermore, middle powers play a critical role in advancing the concept of “developmental diplomacy,” which integrates foreign policy objectives with development goals
| [52] | Hampson, F. O., & Heinbecker, P. (2011). The “new” middle powers: International relations theory and practice. International Journal, 66(2), 299–315. |
[52]
. This approach is particularly evident in their engagement with the “bottom billion”—a term popularized by Collier to describe the world’s poorest populations trapped in cycles of poverty, conflict, and weak governance. Middle powers leverage their diplomatic networks, technical expertise, and regional influence to support capacity-building initiatives, infrastructure projects, and policy reforms tailored to the needs of these vulnerable states
| [6] | Adebajo, A. (2010). The curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War. Oxford University Press. |
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [105] | Six, C. (2009). Postcolonial donors. Third World Quarterly, 30(6), 1103–1121. |
[6, 25, 105]
.
In addition, middle powers contribute to knowledge transfer and innovation diffusion, which are central to endogenous development theory
| [9] | Amsden, A. H. (2001). The rise of “the rest”: Challenges to the West from late-industrializing economies. Oxford University Press. |
| [97] | Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), S71–S102. |
[9, 97]
. Countries such as South Korea and Brazil have shared their development experiences through technical cooperation programs, offering lessons on industrialization, agricultural modernization, and social policy design
| [68] | Kragelund, P. (2010). Non-traditional donors in Africa. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies, 5(1), 7–25. |
| [69] | Li, X. (2017). South–South cooperation. Rising Powers Quarterly, 2(1), 89–109. |
[68, 69]
. This peer-to-peer learning model contrasts with the top-down approaches traditionally associated with Western aid, reinforcing the importance of local ownership and contextual adaptation
| [10] | Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2017). Building state capability: Evidence, analysis, action. Oxford University Press. |
| [38] | Easterly, W. (2006). The white man’s burden. Penguin Press. |
[10, 38]
. The rise of middle powers also intersects with the concept of “emerging donors,” which challenges the conventional dichotomy between donors and recipients
. Emerging donors often prioritize pragmatic cooperation over ideological alignment, focusing on sectors such as infrastructure, energy, and technology
| [20] | Brautigam, D. (2009). The dragon’s gift: The real story of China in Africa. Oxford University Press. |
| [33] | Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A. M., & Tierney, M. J. (2021). Aid, China, and growth. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 13(2), 135–174.
https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180627 |
[20, 33]
. While critics argue that such engagements may lack transparency or reinforce new dependencies, proponents contend that they provide much-needed alternatives for developing countries seeking to diversify their partnerships
| [41] | Evans, P. (1979). Dependent development. Princeton University Press. |
| [98] | Ross, M. L. (2012). The oil curse. Princeton University Press. |
[41, 98]
.
Moreover, middle powers are increasingly active in global governance reform, advocating for a more democratic and representative international order. Their efforts are evident in forums such as the G20, where they have pushed for coordinated responses to global economic crises and greater inclusion of developing economies in decision-making processes
| [29] | Cooper, A. F., & Thakur, R. (2013). The Group of Twenty (G20). Routledge. |
| [67] | Kirton, J. J. (2016). G20 governance. Routledge. |
[29, 67]
. This aligns with the principles of global public goods theory, which emphasizes collective action and shared responsibility in addressing transnational challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and financial instability
| [15] | Barrett, S. (2007). Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global public goods. Oxford University Press. |
| [64] | Kaul, I., Grunberg, I., & Stern, M. A. (Eds.). (1999). Global public goods. Oxford University Press. |
[15, 64]
. Recent scholarship further highlights the evolving role of middle powers in promoting sustainable development and climate governance. Countries such as Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa have emerged as key actors in climate negotiations, balancing economic growth with environmental sustainability
| [13] | Bäckstrand, K., & Elgström, O. (2013). The EU’s role in climate change negotiations: From leader to “leadiator”. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(10), 1369–1386.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.834257 |
| [54] | Hochstetler, K., & Milkoreit, M. (2015). Emerging powers in climate negotiations: Shifting identity conceptions. Political Research Quarterly, 68(1), 224–235.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914560751 |
[13, 54]
. Their engagement underscores the integration of development theory with sustainability paradigms, particularly the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which emphasize inclusive and equitable growth
| [103] | Sachs, J. D., Kroll, C., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G., & Woelm, F. (2021). Sustainable development report 2021. Cambridge University Press. |
| [109] | United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2020). Human development report 2020. UNDP. |
[103, 109]
.
The linkage between middle power theory and development studies reveals a transformative shift in the global development landscape. Middle powers, through their hybrid identities and strategic positioning, are redefining the norms and practices of international development. By promoting South–South cooperation, advocating institutional reform, and fostering alternative development pathways, they contribute to a more inclusive and multipolar global order. This evolving role not only challenges traditional hierarchies but also offers new opportunities for addressing the complex development challenges facing the bottom billion in the 21st century.
2.5. Synthesis and Analytical Implications
The analysis of middle powers and the bottom billion highlights the intricate interplay between global power structures, state behaviour, and development outcomes. Conceptually, middle powers are defined less by their raw capabilities and more by their behaviour, multilateral engagement, and normative influence
| [28] | Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R., & Nossal, K. (1993). Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order. UBC Press. |
| [65] | Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press. |
[28, 65]
. They act as system stabilisers, leveraging soft power and institutional platforms to influence global norms and policies in areas ranging from conflict resolution to sustainable development
| [73] | Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations. Palgrave Macmillan. |
| [82] | Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs. |
[73, 82]
. By contrast, bottom billion countries are trapped in cycles of underdevelopment caused by structural constraints, resource dependence, geographical disadvantages, and weak governance
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [32] | Dowden, R. (2008). Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. Portobello Books. |
| [84] | Okonjo-Iweala, N. (2007). Reforming the unreformable. MIT Press. |
[25, 32, 84]
. Integrating these two conceptual threads reveals a critical insight: middle powers can serve as catalysts for positive development outcomes, but their effectiveness depends on their ability to navigate complex political, economic, and institutional landscapes. Through active participation in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and regional organisations like African Union, middle powers can project influence disproportionate to their material capabilities, shaping norms and policies that directly or indirectly affect bottom billion countries
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [100] | Ruggie, J. G. (1998). Constructing the world polity. International Organization, 52(4), 855–885.
https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
[4, 27, 100]
.
From a development perspective, bottom billion countries require interventions that address both structural and institutional deficits. Structuralist analyses highlight the global inequities that limit peripheral countries’ integration into the world economy, including trade imbalances, resource dependency, and historical legacies of colonialism
| [90] | Prebisch, R. (1950). Economic development of Latin America. United Nations. |
| [95] | Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications. |
| [114] | Wallerstein, I. (1974). The modern world-system. Academic Press. |
[90, 95, 114]
. Institutional perspectives emphasise governance quality, transparency, and political stability as determinants of sustainable development
| [2] | Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown Business. |
| [80] | North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change. Cambridge University Press. |
| [87] | Patrick, S. (2017). The sovereignty wars. Oxford University Press. |
[2, 80, 87]
. Middle powers, therefore, can be effective partners in facilitating reforms that strengthen domestic institutions while advocating for more equitable global economic arrangements. Moreover, the integration of soft power and constructivist theory underscores the normative dimension of middle power influence. By promoting global norms such as human rights, environmental sustainability, and good governance, middle powers can create enabling conditions for bottom billion countries to escape poverty traps
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [45] | Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
[4, 45, 85]
. These states can act as brokers, linking external resources with internal reform efforts, mediating conflicts, and shaping multilateral agendas to prioritise inclusive development.
However, the analytical implications also suggest limits to middle power influence. Structural constraints in the global system, combined with persistent domestic governance challenges, mean that middle powers cannot unilaterally transform bottom billion outcomes
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [32] | Dowden, R. (2008). Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. Portobello Books. |
| [101] | Sachs, J. D. (2005). The end of poverty: Economic possibilities for our time. Penguin Press. |
[25, 32, 101]
. Effective engagement requires coordinated multilateral action, long-term commitment, and context-sensitive strategies that respect local agency while leveraging external expertise and resources. In synthesising the literature, it becomes evident that a comprehensive approach to global poverty reduction must recognise the interdependence between global governance, middle power diplomacy, and domestic institutional reform. Middle powers possess unique capacities to influence international norms, provide technical assistance, and mobilise coalitions, but their impact is maximised when aligned with domestic efforts in bottom billion countries to enhance governance, reduce conflict, and implement sustainable development policies
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
| [96] | Rodrik, D. (2007). One economics, many recipes. Princeton University Press. |
| [106] | Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. W. W. Norton & Company. |
[85, 96, 106]
. Ultimately, this synthesis suggests a conceptual model in which middle powers operate as norm entrepreneurs and development facilitators within a multipolar global system. By leveraging soft power, multilateral engagement, and coalition-building, they can help mitigate the structural and institutional traps that constrain the bottom billion. This framework provides a robust analytical lens for understanding the intersection between global power dynamics and persistent poverty, highlighting both opportunities and limitations for international development policy.
4. The Strategic Role of Middle Powers in Geopolitics
Middle powers occupy a distinctive and increasingly consequential position in the contemporary international system, situated between great powers and smaller, less influential states. Their strategic relevance derives not primarily from overwhelming material capabilities, but from behavioural attributes such as coalition-building, diplomatic activism, and norm entrepreneurship
| [28] | Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R., & Nossal, K. (1993). Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order. UBC Press. |
| [61] | Jordaan, E. (2003). The concept of a middle power in international relations. Politikon, 30(2), 165–181.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0258934032000147282 |
| [65] | Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press. |
[28, 61, 65]
. As global politics transitions toward a more fluid and multipolar order, middle powers have demonstrated an enhanced capacity to shape outcomes through strategic engagement, institutional participation, and ideational influence (Narlikar, 2013; Acharya, 2014; Ikenberry, 2018).
One of the most prominent roles played by middle powers is that of conflict mediation and diplomatic brokerage. Due to their relative neutrality and credibility, they are often perceived as less threatening than great powers, enabling them to facilitate dialogue in contentious geopolitical environments
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [52] | Hampson, F. O., & Heinbecker, P. (2011). The “new” middle powers: International relations theory and practice. International Journal, 66(2), 299–315. |
| [73] | Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations. Palgrave Macmillan. |
[27, 52, 73]
. A classic example is Norway’s mediation of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which underscores how middle powers can leverage trust and discretion to advance peace processes
| [16] | Bercovitch, J., & Jackson, R. (2009). Conflict resolution in the twenty-first century. University of Michigan Press. |
| [113] | Waage, H. H. (2004). Peacemaking. International Peacekeeping, 11(4), 649–670. |
[16, 113]
. Similarly, countries such as Canada and Sweden have long histories of engagement in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction, contributing troops, resources, and diplomatic expertise to United Nations missions
| [35] | Durch, W. J. (Ed.). (2006). Twenty-first-century peace operations. USIP Press. |
| [63] | Karlsrud, J. (2019). United Nations peacekeeping and legitimacy. Palgrave Macmillan. |
| [86] | Paris, R. (2010). Peacebuilding. International Security, 36(2), 54–89. |
[35, 63, 86]
. More recently, states like Qatar and Turkey have emerged as mediators in regional conflicts, reflecting the diversification of middle power diplomacy in the 21st century
| [62] | Kamrava, M. (2013). Qatar: Small state, big politics. Cornell University Press. |
[62]
.
Middle powers are also central advocates of multilateralism, viewing international institutions as platforms through which they can amplify their influence and shape global governance
| [57] | Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
| [66] | Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2012). Power and interdependence (4th ed.). Longman. |
| [100] | Ruggie, J. G. (1998). Constructing the world polity. International Organization, 52(4), 855–885.
https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
[57, 66, 100]
. Their commitment to rules-based international order is particularly significant in an era marked by great power rivalry and institutional contestation
| [5] | Acharya, A. (2018). Constructing global order: Agency and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press. |
| [59] | Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7–23.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241 |
[5, 59]
. Through active participation in organisations such as the United Nations, the G20, the World Trade Organization, and regional bodies like the African Union and ASEAN, middle powers promote collective responses to transnational challenges including climate change, pandemics, terrorism, and financial instability
| [42] | Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape power. International Security, 44(1), 42–79.
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351 |
| [51] | Hale, T., Held, D., & Young, K. (2013). Gridlock: Why global cooperation is failing. Polity Press. |
[42, 51]
. Their advocacy reinforces institutional legitimacy and helps sustain cooperative norms even in the face of geopolitical fragmentation (Zürn, 2018; Patrick, 2017).
Another critical dimension of middle power influence lies in norm entrepreneurship—the process by which states shape, promote, and institutionalise international norms
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [45] | Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
[4, 45]
. Middle powers often act as “norm catalysts,” advancing agendas related to human rights, environmental sustainability, gender equality, and development cooperation
| [18] | Björkdahl, A. (2008). Norm advocacy: A small state strategy. Journal of International Relations and Development, 11(2), 135–154. |
| [60] | Ingebritsen, C. (2002). Norm entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s role in world politics. Cooperation and Conflict, 37(1), 11–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836702037001002 |
[18, 60]
. For instance, Germany and Japan have played pivotal roles in advancing global climate governance and development assistance frameworks, leveraging financial resources, technological expertise, and diplomatic networks to influence international standards
| [17] | Betzold, C. (2010). Borrowing power to influence international negotiations. Global Environmental Politics, 10(3), 131–148. |
| [77] | Nakano, J. (2018). Energy security. CSIS Reports. |
| [83] | Nye, J. S. (2011). The future of power. PublicAffairs. |
[17, 77, 83]
. Likewise, countries such as Canada and Norway have championed humanitarian norms, including the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and international humanitarian law
| [40] | Evans, G. (2008). The responsibility to protect. Brookings Institution Press. |
| [108] | Thakur, R. (2016). The responsibility to protect: Norms, laws and the third world. Cambridge University Press. |
[40, 108]
. Through such efforts, middle powers extend their influence beyond traditional metrics of power, shaping global behaviour in ways that reflect both strategic interests and normative commitments
| [22] | Checkel, J. T. (2005). International institutions and socialization in Europe. International Organization, 59(4), 801–826. |
| [117] | Wiener, A. (2014). A theory of contestation. Springer. |
[22, 117]
.
In addition to their global roles, middle powers provide stabilising leadership within their respective regions. They often function as regional anchors, fostering integration, managing conflicts, and promoting economic development
| [46] | Flemes, D. (2010). Regional leadership in the global system. GIGA Working Papers. |
| [57] | Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
[46, 57]
. South Africa in Southern Africa, Brazil in Latin America, and India in South Asia exemplify middle powers that exert regional influence through infrastructure development, peacekeeping initiatives, and diplomatic engagement
| [7] | Alden, C., & Le Pere, G. (2009). South Africa in Africa: Bound to lead? Politikon, 36(1), 145–169.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02589340903155335 |
| [70] | Malone, D. M. (2011). Does the elephant dance? Oxford University Press. |
[7, 70]
. Indonesia and Nigeria have similarly played leadership roles within ASEAN and ECOWAS respectively, contributing to regional security and governance frameworks
| [3] | Acharya, A. (2014a). The end of American world order. Polity Press. |
| [6] | Adebajo, A. (2010). The curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War. Oxford University Press. |
[3, 6]
. These states often act as intermediaries between global and regional systems, translating global norms into regional practices and ensuring policy coherence across different levels of governance
.
Furthermore, middle powers are increasingly important actors in addressing global public goods and transnational challenges. Their participation in climate negotiations, global health governance, and sustainable development initiatives underscores their growing influence in shaping collective responses to complex global issues
| [51] | Hale, T., Held, D., & Young, K. (2013). Gridlock: Why global cooperation is failing. Polity Press. |
| [64] | Kaul, I., Grunberg, I., & Stern, M. A. (Eds.). (1999). Global public goods. Oxford University Press. |
| [103] | Sachs, J. D., Kroll, C., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G., & Woelm, F. (2021). Sustainable development report 2021. Cambridge University Press. |
[51, 64, 103]
. Countries such as South Korea, Mexico, and Indonesia have demonstrated leadership in advancing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate commitments under the Paris Agreement
| [54] | Hochstetler, K., & Milkoreit, M. (2015). Emerging powers in climate negotiations: Shifting identity conceptions. Political Research Quarterly, 68(1), 224–235.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914560751 |
| [112] | Viola, E., & Franchini, M. (2018). Brazil and climate governance. Routledge. |
[54, 112]
. Their ability to bridge developed and developing country perspectives enhances their effectiveness in negotiating consensus and fostering inclusive solutions
| [36] | Dubash, N. K. (2013). The politics of climate change in India. Oxford University Press. |
| [94] | Roberts, J. T., & Parks, B. C. (2007). A climate of injustice. MIT Press. |
[36, 94]
.
Recent scholarship also highlights the evolving role of middle powers in digital governance, economic diplomacy, and global supply chain restructuring. As technological competition intensifies, middle powers such as the Netherlands, Singapore, and South Korea are leveraging innovation and regulatory frameworks to shape emerging domains such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and data governance
| [1] | Aaronson, S. A. (2021). Data is different: Why the world needs a new approach to governing cross-border data flows. CIGI. |
| [42] | Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape power. International Security, 44(1), 42–79.
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351 |
[1, 42]
. These developments illustrate how middle powers are adapting to new geopolitical realities, expanding their influence into non-traditional arenas of global governance
| [14] | Baldwin, D. A. (2016). Power and international relations: A conceptual approach. Princeton University Press. |
| [34] | Drezner, D. W. (2021). The song remains the same: International relations after COVID 19. Princeton University Press. |
[14, 34]
.
In sum, the strategic role of middle powers in geopolitics is multifaceted and dynamic. Through conflict mediation, multilateral engagement, norm entrepreneurship, and regional leadership, they exert influence that often exceeds their material capabilities. Their emphasis on soft power, coalition-building, and institutional participation enables them to navigate the complexities of a multipolar world while contributing to global stability and cooperation (Nye, 2004; Cooper, 2011; Acharya, 2014). As the international system continues to evolve, middle powers are likely to remain pivotal actors in shaping both global governance and regional order, bridging divides between great powers and smaller states while advancing inclusive and sustainable development agendas (Ikenberry, 2018; Narlikar, 2021).
5. The Bottom Billion: Challenges and Constraints
The bottom billion, as conceptualised by Paul Collier, represent populations trapped in chronic poverty and underdevelopment despite decades of global economic growth
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
[25]
. These countries are characterised by persistent structural constraints that limit their ability to achieve sustainable development. Political instability is a pervasive challenge; fragile states frequently experience weak governance, corruption, and frequent changes in leadership, which undermine policy continuity and the implementation of development programmes
| [2] | Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown Business. |
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
[2, 25, 85]
. Civil conflict, insurgency, and ethnic violence create a self-reinforcing cycle in which insecurity prevents investment and economic activity, while poverty and exclusion increase the likelihood of political unrest
| [26] | Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563–595.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064 |
| [32] | Dowden, R. (2008). Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. Portobello Books. |
| [44] | Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review, 97(1), 75–90. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000534 |
[26, 32, 44]
.
Weak institutional capacity compounds these challenges. Bottom billion countries often suffer from ineffective bureaucracies, poor regulatory frameworks, and inadequate public service delivery, which inhibit the mobilisation of resources for development and the enforcement of the rule of law
| [80] | North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change. Cambridge University Press. |
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
| [99] | Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government. Cambridge University Press. |
[80, 85, 99]
. The prevalence of extractive institutions, where political elites capture economic rents for personal gain, further erodes state legitimacy and reduces incentives for inclusive growth
| [2] | Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown Business. |
| [38] | Easterly, W. (2006). The white man’s burden. Penguin Press. |
[2, 38]
. Weak institutions also limit these countries’ capacity to respond to external shocks, including commodity price volatility, climate-related disasters, and global economic crises, leaving them particularly vulnerable in a highly interconnected global economy
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [101] | Sachs, J. D. (2005). The end of poverty: Economic possibilities for our time. Penguin Press. |
| [106] | Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. W. W. Norton & Company. |
[25, 101, 106]
.
Geographical and economic constraints exacerbate these institutional weaknesses. Many bottom billion countries are landlocked, limiting access to global markets and increasing transportation costs for trade
. Others are heavily dependent on primary commodities, making their economies vulnerable to external price fluctuations and reducing opportunities for industrial diversification
| [12] | Auty, R. M. (1993). Sustaining development in mineral economies: The resource curse thesis. Routledge. |
| [98] | Ross, M. L. (2012). The oil curse. Princeton University Press. |
| [102] | Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). Resource curse. European Economic Review, 45(4–6), 827–838.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8 |
[12, 98, 102]
. The “resource curse” demonstrates how resource wealth, rather than guaranteeing prosperity, can incentivise rent-seeking, corruption, and authoritarian governance, further limiting long-term development prospects
| [12] | Auty, R. M. (1993). Sustaining development in mineral economies: The resource curse thesis. Routledge. |
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [98] | Ross, M. L. (2012). The oil curse. Princeton University Press. |
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.
External interventions by global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have attempted to alleviate these constraints through loans, technical assistance, and structural adjustment programmes. While these interventions have provided critical financial and technical support, they have often been criticised for failing to adequately reflect local contexts or institutional realities
| [36] | Dubash, N. K. (2013). The politics of climate change in India. Oxford University Press. |
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
| [106] | Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. W. W. Norton & Company. |
[36, 85, 106]
. Standardised policy prescriptions—such as rapid trade liberalisation or fiscal austerity—have sometimes exacerbated inequalities, weakened public service delivery, and generated social unrest, illustrating the limits of externally driven development strategies
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [32] | Dowden, R. (2008). Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. Portobello Books. |
| [96] | Rodrik, D. (2007). One economics, many recipes. Princeton University Press. |
[25, 32, 96]
.
Furthermore, historical and structural legacies play a significant role in perpetuating underdevelopment. Colonialism, imposed economic dependency, and patterns of unequal trade have left enduring institutional and economic distortions that continue to disadvantage bottom billion countries
| [90] | Prebisch, R. (1950). Economic development of Latin America. United Nations. |
| [95] | Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications. |
| [114] | Wallerstein, I. (1974). The modern world-system. Academic Press. |
[90, 95, 114]
. These legacies intersect with contemporary global governance structures, where rules and norms often reflect the interests of more powerful states, limiting the agency of poorer nations to influence international economic and political decision-making
| [21] | Cardoso, F. H., & Faletto, E. (1979). Dependency and development in Latin America. University of California Press. |
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
[21, 57]
.
Social and human development deficits also present critical constraints. Education, healthcare, and infrastructure in bottom billion countries are frequently inadequate, limiting human capital development and the population’s capacity to participate in economic and political life
| [81] | Nussbaum, M. C. (2011). Creating capabilities. Harvard University Press. |
| [104] | Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford University Press. |
| [110] | UNDP. (1990). Human development report 1990. Oxford University Press. |
[81, 104, 110]
. High fertility rates, youth unemployment, and urbanisation pressures exacerbate social and economic vulnerabilities, creating demographic and developmental pressures that governments struggle to address
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [32] | Dowden, R. (2008). Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. Portobello Books. |
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
[25, 32, 85]
.
Bottom billion countries face a multifaceted set of challenges and constraints encompassing political, institutional, economic, and social dimensions. Persistent instability, weak governance, geographic disadvantages, dependence on primary commodities, and historical structural inequalities combine to trap these countries in cycles of underdevelopment. While global institutions provide support, the effectiveness of such interventions is contingent upon alignment with domestic realities, institutional reforms, and context-sensitive strategies. Understanding these constraints is essential for evaluating how middle powers, through diplomacy, development assistance, and normative engagement, can influence the trajectory of development in these countries.
Table 1. Key Poverty Indicators in Selected Bottom Billion Countries.
Indicator | Description | Africa Average | South Asia Average | Source |
GDP per capita (current US$) | Average economic output per person | 1,625 | 1,965 | World Bank, 2023 |
Poverty headcount ratio (% of population below $2.15/day) | Share of population living in extreme poverty | 44% | 27% | World Bank, 2023 |
Life expectancy at birth (years) | Average expected lifespan | 64 | 70 | UNDP, 2022 |
Adult literacy rate (%) | Percentage of population aged 15+ who can read/write | 63% | 72% | UNESCO, 2022 |
Access to electricity (%) | Percentage of population with electricity | 48% | 80% | IEA, 2022 |
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) | Deaths of children under 1 year | 55 | 32 | WHO, 2022 |
Governance effectiveness index | Measures quality of public services, policy formulation, and implementation (-2.5 to +2.5) | -0.65 | -0.12 | World Bank, 2023 |
Human Development Index (HDI) | Composite index of life expectancy, education, and income (0–1) | 0.534 | 0.623 | UNDP, 2022 |
Source: Compiled by the writer with information from World Bank (2023), UNDP (2022), UNESCO (2022), IEA (2022), WHO (2022).
Table 1 highlights critical socio-economic and developmental indicators for countries within the bottom billion, illustrating the persistent structural challenges they face. GDP per capita figures show extremely low income levels in Sub-Saharan Africa (US$1,625) and South Asia (US$1,965), reflecting limited economic opportunities and low productivity (World Bank, 2023). The poverty headcount ratio indicates that a significant portion of the population lives below the $2.15/day extreme poverty threshold, with Sub-Saharan Africa particularly affected at 44% (World Bank, 2023). Human development indicators, including life expectancy and literacy rates, remain below global averages, demonstrating deficits in health, education, and human capital (UNDP, 2022; UNESCO, 2022). Infrastructure access is similarly constrained, with less than half of the African population having electricity, while infant mortality rates remain alarmingly high (IEA, 2022; WHO, 2022). Governance effectiveness and HDI scores further underline institutional weaknesses and systemic vulnerabilities. Collectively, these indicators provide a comprehensive snapshot of the persistent socio-economic and governance constraints limiting development in bottom billion countries, setting the context for middle power engagement.
6. Middle Powers and Developmental Engagement
Middle powers play an increasingly significant role in supporting the development of bottom billion countries through a combination of diplomatic, economic, and normative strategies. Their engagement is characterised by the use of soft power, multilateralism, and institutional influence, which enables them to exert an impact disproportionate to their material capabilities
| [28] | Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R., & Nossal, K. (1993). Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order. UBC Press. |
| [65] | Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press. |
| [82] | Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs. |
[28, 65, 82]
. These states leverage historical experience, technical expertise, and regional influence to address the structural constraints faced by bottom billion countries, including weak governance, economic dependence, and social underdevelopment
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [32] | Dowden, R. (2008). Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. Portobello Books. |
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
[25, 32, 85]
.
One of the primary mechanisms through which middle powers engage with developing countries is South–South cooperation. This framework promotes collaboration among developing states to share knowledge, coordinate policy, and mobilise resources without relying solely on traditional Western-led aid channels
| [43] | Fawcett, L. (2015). International relations of the Middle East (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. |
| [57] | Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
[43,57,4]
. Institutions such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) exemplify this approach, providing platforms for infrastructure investment, technical assistance, and financial cooperation tailored to the needs of the Global South
| [11] | Armijo, L. E. (2007). The BRICS countries as analytical category: Mirage or insight? Asian Perspective, 31(4), 7–42. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2007.0014 |
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [107] | Stuenkel, O. (2015). The BRICS and the future of global order. Lexington Books. |
[11,27,107]
. Such initiatives enable middle powers to act as brokers of development, facilitating partnerships that enhance economic diversification, human capital formation, and institutional strengthening in bottom billion countries
| [43] | Fawcett, L. (2015). International relations of the Middle East (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. |
| [84] | Okonjo-Iweala, N. (2007). Reforming the unreformable. MIT Press. |
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
[43, 84, 85]
.
In addition to institutional cooperation, middle powers provide development assistance and technology transfer that draws on their own experiences of rapid industrialisation and socio-economic transformation. South Korea, for instance, has shared its strategies for export-oriented growth, education reform, and technology adoption with African and Asian countries, offering practical lessons that are adaptable to local conditions
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [57] | Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
[4, 57]
. Similarly, Brazil’s agricultural and health initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate how middle powers can tailor development programmes to context-specific needs while promoting knowledge transfer and capacity building
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [107] | Stuenkel, O. (2015). The BRICS and the future of global order. Lexington Books. |
[27, 107]
. This approach combines normative leadership with tangible technical support, strengthening both human and institutional capacities in target countries
| [45] | Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
| [75] | Narlikar, A. (2013). Rising powers: Emerging economies in global governance. Oxford University Press. |
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.
Middle powers also contribute significantly to peacekeeping and security support, recognising that stability is a prerequisite for development. Countries such as India, South Africa, and Canada have consistently provided troops, logistical support, and strategic expertise to United Nations missions in fragile states, including regions of Africa and the Middle East
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [57] | Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
[4, 27, 57]
. By stabilising conflict-affected areas, middle powers create conditions conducive to investment, infrastructure development, and social service delivery, helping break cycles of violence and underdevelopment that trap the bottom billion
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [32] | Dowden, R. (2008). Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. Portobello Books. |
| [57] | Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
[25, 32, 57]
. Peacekeeping engagement also allows middle powers to exercise normative influence, advocating for respect for human rights, rule of law, and inclusive governance in host countries
| [43] | Fawcett, L. (2015). International relations of the Middle East (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. |
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
[43, 85]
.
Furthermore, middle powers are active advocates for institutional reform in global governance structures, seeking to increase the representation and voice of developing countries in international decision-making. They push for changes in organisations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank to create more inclusive, equitable mechanisms for global economic and political governance
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [57] | Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
| [106] | Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. W. W. Norton & Company. |
[4, 57, 106]
. By promoting reforms that enhance transparency, accountability, and participation, middle powers strengthen the capacity of bottom billion countries to influence the rules and norms that govern trade, finance, and development assistance
| [84] | Okonjo-Iweala, N. (2007). Reforming the unreformable. MIT Press. |
| [96] | Rodrik, D. (2007). One economics, many recipes. Princeton University Press. |
[84, 96]
. This advocacy aligns with constructivist and soft power perspectives, wherein middle powers seek to shape global norms and institutional frameworks to create enabling environments for sustainable development
| [45] | Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
| [73] | Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations. Palgrave Macmillan. |
| [82] | Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs. |
[45, 73, 82]
.
Despite their contributions, middle powers face structural limitations. Their influence is constrained by global power hierarchies, resource limitations, and the domestic challenges of target countries, including governance deficits, conflict, and entrenched poverty (Collier, 2007; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; North, 1990). Effective engagement requires long-term commitment, coordinated multilateral action, and context-sensitive strategies that combine diplomacy, technical assistance, and capacity-building efforts (Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Sachs, 2005; Stiglitz, 2002). By strategically navigating these constraints, middle powers can operate as norm entrepreneurs, development facilitators, and regional stabilisers, contributing to both international stability and the alleviation of extreme poverty.
Middle powers employ a multifaceted strategy in supporting bottom billion countries. Through South–South cooperation, development assistance and technology transfer, peacekeeping, and advocacy for institutional reform, they leverage soft power, multilateral engagement, and normative influence to promote sustainable development. Their approach combines practical interventions with normative leadership, addressing structural and institutional constraints while fostering conditions for long-term stability and growth. This underscores the strategic significance of middle powers in shaping developmental trajectories for the world’s most vulnerable populations and demonstrates the potential for a more inclusive and multipolar global governance system (Keohane, 1984; Cooper, 2011; Acharya, 2014; Okonjo-Iweala, 2007; Dowden, 2008; Hurrell, 2006).
Table 2. Middle Powers’ Engagement in Bottom Billion Countries (Selected Indicators, 2022–2023).
Middle Power | Development Assistance (US$ billion) | South–South Cooperation Projects | UN Peacekeeping Contributions | Technology Transfer / Capacity-Building Programs | Source |
India | 1.2 | 45 projects in Africa & South Asia | 3,200 personnel | ICT, renewable energy, healthcare training | OECD-DAC, 2023; UN, 2023; Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2023 |
Brazil | 0.8 | 28 projects (mainly Latin America & Africa) | 1,050 personnel | Agricultural innovation, bioenergy, tropical medicine | OECD-DAC, 2023; UN, 2023; Itamaraty, 2023 |
South Africa | 0.6 | 22 projects (mainly Southern Africa) | 1,400 personnel | Mining technology, renewable energy, governance capacity-building | OECD-DAC, 2023; UN, 2023; South African Department of International Relations, 2023 |
Development assistance includes both bilateral aid and contributions to multilateral funds.
South–South cooperation projects include infrastructure, education, healthcare, and capacity-building initiatives.
UN Peacekeeping contributions include both military and police personnel deployed in fragile states.
Sources: Compiled by the writer with information from OECD-DAC (2023), UN (2023), Indian Ministry of External Affairs (2023), Itamaraty (Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023), South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (2023).
Table 2 presents a comparative overview of how selected middle powers—India, Brazil, and South Africa—engage with bottom billion countries through development assistance, South–South cooperation, peacekeeping contributions, and technology transfer initiatives. India provides the largest financial assistance, supporting 45 projects across Africa and South Asia, including ICT, renewable energy, and healthcare training, reflecting its dual focus on economic development and capacity-building (OECD-DAC, 2023; Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2023). Brazil emphasizes agricultural innovation, bioenergy, and tropical medicine, primarily targeting Latin America and African nations, while also contributing personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (OECD-DAC, 2023; Itamaraty, 2023). South Africa’s engagement focuses on regional development, governance support, and renewable energy projects in Southern Africa, with a notable presence in UN peacekeeping missions (South African Department of International Relations, 2023). Collectively, the table demonstrates that middle powers leverage financial resources, technical expertise, and normative influence to assist bottom billion countries, highlighting the multifaceted and complementary nature of their developmental diplomacy.
7. Limitations of Middle Power Influence
Despite their active engagement and strategic initiatives, middle powers face significant limitations in their capacity to influence global politics and developmental outcomes, particularly in bottom billion countries. These constraints are deeply embedded in the structural hierarchies of the international system, where great powers continue to dominate security, economic, and normative domains. Middle powers lack the coercive, financial, and technological capabilities necessary to unilaterally enforce policy agendas, making their effectiveness contingent upon cooperation with stronger states and multilateral institutions
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [57] | Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? International Affairs, 82(1), 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00519.x |
| [59] | Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7–23.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241 |
| [65] | Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press. |
| [119] | Zürn, M. (2018). A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation. Oxford University Press. |
[27, 57, 59, 65, 119]
. Even when middle powers such as Brazil, India, or South Africa advocate reforms in global governance, their proposals often require endorsement by dominant actors within institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
| [76] | Narlikar, A. (2021). Resilience and great power politics: Global order in turbulent times. Oxford University Press. |
| [106] | Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. W. W. Norton & Company. |
| [111] | Vestergaard, J., & Wade, R. H. (2015). Still in the woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank puts multilateralism at risk. Global Policy, 6(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12225 |
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. This structural dependence limits their autonomy and constrains their ability to reshape global rules in line with their preferences
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [87] | Patrick, S. (2017). The sovereignty wars. Oxford University Press. |
[4, 87]
.
Another critical limitation arises from domestic capacity constraints within middle powers themselves. Although more capable than smaller states, middle powers frequently contend with internal economic pressures, governance challenges, and political volatility that restrict sustained international engagement
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
| [28] | Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R., & Nossal, K. (1993). Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order. UBC Press. |
| [79] | Nolte, D. (2010). How to compare regional powers. Review of International Studies, 36(4), 881–901.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000103 |
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. Fiscal limitations often constrain foreign aid budgets and development assistance commitments, particularly during periods of economic downturn or domestic crisis
| [34] | Drezner, D. W. (2021). The song remains the same: International relations after COVID 19. Princeton University Press. |
| [72] | Mawdsley, E. (2019). South–South cooperation 2.0? The role of the Global South in development cooperation. Routledge. |
[34, 72]
. Political transitions and leadership changes may also disrupt foreign policy continuity, leading to inconsistencies in diplomatic engagement and development initiatives
| [34] | Drezner, D. W. (2021). The song remains the same: International relations after COVID 19. Princeton University Press. |
| [43] | Fawcett, L. (2015). International relations of the Middle East (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. |
| [75] | Narlikar, A. (2013). Rising powers: Emerging economies in global governance. Oxford University Press. |
[34, 43, 75]
. For instance, shifts in Brazil’s or South Africa’s domestic priorities have periodically reduced their external activism, illustrating how internal dynamics can shape the scope and durability of middle power influence
.
Furthermore, bureaucratic inefficiencies and institutional fragmentation within middle powers can undermine policy implementation. Weak coordination among government agencies, limited technical expertise, and competing domestic priorities may reduce the effectiveness of international initiatives
| [10] | Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2017). Building state capability: Evidence, analysis, action. Oxford University Press. |
| [41] | Evans, P. (1979). Dependent development. Princeton University Press. |
| [80] | North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change. Cambridge University Press. |
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. As a result, middle power strategies are often episodic and reactive rather than sustained and strategic, diminishing their long-term impact on global governance and development outcomes
| [29] | Cooper, A. F., & Thakur, R. (2013). The Group of Twenty (G20). Routledge. |
| [52] | Hampson, F. O., & Heinbecker, P. (2011). The “new” middle powers: International relations theory and practice. International Journal, 66(2), 299–315. |
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.
The structural and institutional conditions within bottom billion countries themselves present another major constraint. Persistent conflict, weak governance, corruption, and limited administrative capacity significantly reduce the effectiveness of external interventions
| [2] | Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown Business. |
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [32] | Dowden, R. (2008). Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles. Portobello Books. |
| [98] | Ross, M. L. (2012). The oil curse. Princeton University Press. |
[2, 25, 32, 98]
. Even well-designed development programs may fail to achieve intended outcomes due to poor implementation, elite capture, or lack of local ownership
| [10] | Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2017). Building state capability: Evidence, analysis, action. Oxford University Press. |
| [38] | Easterly, W. (2006). The white man’s burden. Penguin Press. |
| [85] | Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s economic reforms. Brookings Institution. |
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. Fragile states often lack the institutional frameworks necessary to absorb and utilise external assistance effectively, thereby limiting the transformative potential of middle power engagement (Fukuyama, 2011; Besley & Persson, 2011).
Socioeconomic and cultural factors further complicate development efforts. High levels of poverty, inequality, low human capital, and social fragmentation create complex environments where external interventions face significant barriers
| [81] | Nussbaum, M. C. (2011). Creating capabilities. Harvard University Press. |
| [102] | Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). Resource curse. European Economic Review, 45(4–6), 827–838.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8 |
| [104] | Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford University Press. |
[81, 102, 104]
. In such contexts, development challenges are multidimensional and deeply entrenched, requiring long-term, coordinated efforts that exceed the capacity of individual middle powers
| [96] | Rodrik, D. (2007). One economics, many recipes. Princeton University Press. |
[96]
. Consequently, middle power initiatives often produce incremental rather than transformative outcomes, highlighting the limitations of external assistance in addressing structural development deficits
| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
| [74] | Moyo, D. (2009). Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. |
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.
Geopolitical competition from great powers further constrains middle power agency. In strategically significant regions, the presence of dominant actors such as the United States, China, and the European Union can overshadow or conflict with middle power initiatives
. Competing geopolitical interests may limit the space for middle powers to pursue independent agendas, forcing them to align with or adapt to the priorities of larger powers
| [14] | Baldwin, D. A. (2016). Power and international relations: A conceptual approach. Princeton University Press. |
| [83] | Nye, J. S. (2011). The future of power. PublicAffairs. |
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. For example, China’s extensive infrastructure investments in Africa through the Belt and Road Initiative have reshaped development dynamics, often eclipsing the contributions of traditional and emerging middle powers
| [20] | Brautigam, D. (2009). The dragon’s gift: The real story of China in Africa. Oxford University Press. |
| [47] | Gallagher, K. P. (2016). The China triangle. Oxford University Press. |
[20, 47]
. This competitive environment reduces the relative influence of middle powers and complicates coordination efforts
| [34] | Drezner, D. W. (2021). The song remains the same: International relations after COVID 19. Princeton University Press. |
| [42] | Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape power. International Security, 44(1), 42–79.
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351 |
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.
In addition, middle powers face constraints in global governance due to limited resources and capabilities. While they excel in diplomacy, coalition-building, and norm promotion, they lack the financial scale, military reach, and technological dominance of great powers
| [27] | Cooper, A. F. (2011). Middle powers and the emerging global order. Global Governance, 17(4), 439–456. |
| [73] | Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations. Palgrave Macmillan. |
| [82] | Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs. |
[27, 73, 82]
. As a result, their role is often confined to facilitative or catalytic functions rather than direct enforcement of policies or structural reforms
| [51] | Hale, T., Held, D., & Young, K. (2013). Gridlock: Why global cooperation is failing. Polity Press. |
| [108] | Thakur, R. (2016). The responsibility to protect: Norms, laws and the third world. Cambridge University Press. |
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. Their influence depends heavily on the willingness of other actors to adopt and implement the norms and policies they advocate
| [22] | Checkel, J. T. (2005). International institutions and socialization in Europe. International Organization, 59(4), 801–826. |
| [45] | Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 |
[22, 45]
.
Moreover, institutional inertia within global governance structures poses a significant barrier. Established institutions such as the IMF and World Bank are often resistant to reform, reflecting the entrenched interests of dominant states
. Efforts by middle powers to democratize these institutions or enhance representation for developing countries frequently encounter political resistance and slow progress
| [76] | Narlikar, A. (2021). Resilience and great power politics: Global order in turbulent times. Oxford University Press. |
| [119] | Zürn, M. (2018). A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation. Oxford University Press. |
[76, 119]
. This limits the extent to which middle powers can influence global decision-making processes and implement meaningful reforms
| [87] | Patrick, S. (2017). The sovereignty wars. Oxford University Press. |
[87]
.
Finally, long-term structural traps affecting bottom billion countries—including geographic disadvantages, resource dependence, and historical legacies of colonialism—further constrain the impact of middle power engagement
| [90] | Prebisch, R. (1950). Economic development of Latin America. United Nations. |
| [95] | Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications. |
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. Geographic isolation, poor infrastructure, and vulnerability to climate change also exacerbate development challenges, limiting the effectiveness of external interventions (Gallup, Sachs, & Mellinger, 1999; UNDP, 2020). These structural factors require systemic and multilateral solutions that go beyond the capabilities of individual middle powers
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The limitations of middle power influence are multifaceted, arising from systemic, domestic, and contextual factors. Structural hierarchies in global politics, domestic capacity constraints, fragile institutions in recipient countries, geopolitical competition, and entrenched development challenges collectively restrict the effectiveness of middle power strategies. While middle powers remain important actors in promoting multilateralism, norm diffusion, and development cooperation, their influence is inherently constrained and dependent on broader systemic conditions. Achieving meaningful developmental and geopolitical outcomes therefore requires coordinated multilateral action, sustained engagement, and structural reforms that address the underlying causes of inequality and underdevelopment
| [4] | Acharya, A. (2014b). The making of global international relations: Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary. Cambridge University Press. |
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| [25] | Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. |
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.
8. Implications for Africa and Emerging Economies
Middle power engagement carries significant implications for Africa and emerging economies, presenting both opportunities for development and challenges that require strategic navigation. For countries such as Nigeria, which is a regional power in Sub-Saharan Africa, partnerships with middle powers offer avenues to strengthen economic, political, and institutional capacities while enhancing regional influence. By collaborating with states like India, Brazil, South Africa, and South Korea, Nigeria can access technical expertise, development finance, and knowledge transfer models that have been successfully applied in similar emerging economy contexts (Acharya, 2014; Cooper, 2011; Okonjo-Iweala, 2007).
In the African context, middle power engagement has the potential to catalyse infrastructure development, including transport networks, energy projects, and digital connectivity, which are critical for economic diversification and integration into global value chains (Fawcett, 2015; Hurrell, 2006; Stuenkel, 2016). For example, India’s technical assistance in ICT and healthcare, Brazil’s agricultural development programmes, and South Africa’s regional industrial initiatives demonstrate how collaborative development models can complement domestic policies to address structural constraints and accelerate growth (Cooper, 2011; Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Melissen, 2005).
Middle power partnerships can also strengthen governance and institutional capacity. By promoting normative frameworks, transparency, and rule-of-law principles, middle powers contribute to stabilising political environments and improving policy effectiveness in bottom billion countries (Collier, 2007; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Dowden, 2008). In Nigeria, engagement with middle powers can support anti-corruption initiatives, public sector reforms, and capacity-building in critical institutions, reducing governance deficits that have historically hindered development (Okonjo-Iweala, 2007; Stiglitz, 2002; Hurrell, 2006).
Peace and security constitute another area where middle power engagement is impactful. Middle powers often participate in regional peacekeeping missions and conflict mediation, creating conditions for economic activity and long-term development. In conflict-prone areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigeria’s northern and central regions, partnerships with middle powers in peacebuilding, security assistance, and crisis management can stabilise communities and facilitate developmental interventions (Acharya, 2014; Cooper, 2011; Melissen, 2005). Such support reinforces regional resilience and enhances the capacity of African states to participate meaningfully in continental and global governance structures.
However, the engagement of middle powers also presents challenges. African and emerging economies must navigate potential dependencies, ensuring that partnerships do not undermine domestic agency or create overreliance on external actors (Hurrell, 2006; Collier, 2007). Resource limitations and geopolitical competition can constrain middle powers, meaning that African countries like Nigeria need to strategically prioritise collaborations that align with national development plans and long-term objectives (Fawcett, 2015; Stuenkel, 2016; Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). Additionally, structural challenges within bottom billion countries—including institutional weaknesses, social inequalities, and regional disparities—may limit the transformative impact of middle power interventions unless complemented by domestic reforms and inclusive policy frameworks (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Collier, 2007; Rodney, 1972).
Overall, the implications of middle power engagement for Africa and emerging economies are profound. For countries like Nigeria, strategic partnerships offer pathways to accelerate infrastructure development, improve governance, and foster economic diversification, while simultaneously enhancing regional and global influence. Effective engagement requires careful alignment with domestic priorities, a focus on capacity-building, and leveraging normative and technical resources offered by middle powers. By adopting a proactive and strategic approach, African nations can maximise the benefits of middle power collaboration, translating diplomatic engagement into tangible developmental outcomes and contributing to a more multipolar and inclusive global order (Acharya, 2014; Cooper, 2011; Okonjo-Iweala, 2007; Fawcett, 2015; Hurrell, 2006; Dowden, 2008).
9. Conclusion
This study has examined the strategic role of middle powers in geopolitics and their engagement with bottom billion countries, highlighting both opportunities and constraints within the contemporary multipolar system. Middle powers, defined not solely by their material capacities but by their behavioural strategies, diplomatic engagement, and normative influence, occupy a critical position in global governance. Through mediation, coalition-building, norm entrepreneurship, and regional leadership, middle powers can shape outcomes disproportionate to their economic and military capabilities, providing stabilising influence in both global and regional contexts (Keohane, 1984; Cooper, 2011; Acharya, 2014; Nye, 2004).
The persistent challenges facing bottom billion countries—including weak governance, conflict, resource dependency, and structural inequality—underscore the complexity of promoting development in the most vulnerable regions (Collier, 2007; Dowden, 2008; Okonjo-Iweala, 2007). These structural constraints, rooted in historical legacies and contemporary global inequalities, limit the effectiveness of external interventions and necessitate nuanced, context-sensitive approaches. Middle powers, by leveraging soft power, multilateral institutions, and knowledge transfer, provide alternative mechanisms for engagement that are often more adaptable and locally relevant than traditional great power strategies (Fawcett, 2015; Hurrell, 2006; Melissen, 2005).
Middle powers facilitate development through mechanisms such as South–South cooperation, technical assistance, peacekeeping, and advocacy for institutional reform. Their initiatives in knowledge sharing, technology transfer, and regional stability have shown tangible benefits in bottom billion regions, contributing to infrastructure development, human capital formation, and governance improvement (Stuenkel, 2016; Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Cooper, 2011). Examples from India, Brazil, South Korea, and South Africa illustrate how middle powers can combine normative leadership with practical interventions to enhance development outcomes (Acharya, 2014; Hurrell, 2006; Okonjo-Iweala, 2007).
However, middle power influence is not without limitations. Structural hierarchies in the international system, domestic capacity constraints, competition from great powers, and the entrenched weaknesses of bottom billion countries reduce the scope and sustainability of their impact (Keohane, 1984; Collier, 2007; Dowden, 2008). Middle powers often operate within the constraints of global institutions and are required to navigate complex geopolitical dynamics to achieve their objectives, highlighting the importance of multilateral coordination and long-term engagement.
For Africa and other emerging economies, middle power engagement presents both opportunities and strategic challenges. Countries like Nigeria can leverage partnerships with middle powers to accelerate infrastructure development, improve governance, foster economic diversification, and enhance regional and global influence (Acharya, 2014; Cooper, 2011; Okonjo-Iweala, 2007). Yet, effective utilisation of these partnerships requires strategic planning, alignment with domestic priorities, and complementary reforms to maximise the developmental benefits while avoiding dependency or overreliance on external actors (Fawcett, 2015; Stuenkel, 2016; Hurrell, 2006).
Middle powers constitute an indispensable component of contemporary global governance. By deploying soft power, advancing normative agendas, and engaging in practical development initiatives, they provide critical support to bottom billion countries while contributing to regional stability and global multipolarity. Their effectiveness, however, is contingent upon careful coordination, domestic capacity, and the ability to navigate structural constraints in both the global system and recipient countries. For Africa and emerging economies, strategic engagement with middle powers offers a pathway to enhance development, promote good governance, and strengthen regional influence, illustrating the transformative potential of middle power diplomacy in a complex and unequal international order.
Recommendations and Policy Implications
Building on the analysis of middle powers and bottom billion engagement, several recommendations and policy implications emerge for both middle powers themselves and emerging economies, particularly in Africa. These focus on maximising developmental impact, enhancing governance, and promoting sustainable, inclusive growth in line with global multipolarity.
First, middle powers should adopt strategically tailored development interventions that align with the specific needs and capacities of bottom billion countries. While multilateral frameworks like BRICS, G20, and regional initiatives provide important platforms, development strategies must account for local institutional contexts, governance structures, and socio-economic realities (Okonjo-Iweala, 2007; Collier, 2007; Fawcett, 2015). For instance, technical assistance and technology transfer programs should be coupled with capacity-building initiatives to ensure that local institutions can implement and sustain development projects effectively (Hurrell, 2006; Stuenkel, 2016).
Second, middle powers should continue to strengthen institutional and normative engagement by advocating reforms that enhance the representation and voice of developing countries in global governance institutions such as the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank (Acharya, 2014; Hurrell, 2006; Stiglitz, 2002). Greater inclusivity in decision-making ensures that development policies are contextually appropriate and reflects the priorities of bottom billion populations, thus increasing legitimacy and effectiveness (Cooper, 2011; Nye, 2011; Melissen, 2005).
Third, middle powers should leverage peacebuilding and security interventions as integral components of development. Sustained stability is a prerequisite for economic growth, social progress, and institutional reform (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Dowden, 2008; Acharya, 2014). In regions prone to conflict, coordinated peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and mediation efforts can create enabling environments for infrastructure development, investment, and human capital formation. African states, such as Nigeria, can benefit from such engagements by integrating regional security strategies with domestic development priorities.
Fourth, emerging economies and bottom billion countries should proactively engage middle powers as partners rather than passive recipients. Countries like Nigeria can strategically select partnerships that complement national development plans, prioritising projects that enhance infrastructure, diversify the economy, strengthen institutions, and address socio-economic inequalities (Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Fawcett, 2015; Hurrell, 2006). This requires robust domestic governance, transparent policy frameworks, and institutional capacity to manage foreign partnerships effectively, ensuring accountability and sustainability.
Fifth, both middle powers and emerging economies should emphasise South–South cooperation and knowledge sharing, which provides development solutions that are contextually relevant and culturally resonant (Stuenkel, 2016; Cooper, 2011; Acharya, 2014). By exchanging experiences in industrialisation, healthcare, agriculture, and technology adoption, countries can avoid the pitfalls of one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions and promote endogenous development that builds local capacity.
Lastly, the policy focus should incorporate long-term, multipronged strategies that combine economic, social, and normative interventions. Middle powers should continue to champion soft power tools—norm promotion, coalition-building, and advocacy for human rights and sustainable development—while providing tangible technical and financial support (Nye, 2004; Melissen, 2005; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Simultaneously, bottom billion countries must implement domestic reforms to strengthen institutions, reduce corruption, and create an environment conducive to investment and human development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Collier, 2007; Okonjo-Iweala, 2007).
In essence, the policy implications underscore a strategic partnership model: middle powers act as facilitators, norm entrepreneurs, and development catalysts, while bottom billion countries actively harness these opportunities to advance their developmental objectives. For Africa and emerging economies, this model offers a pathway to accelerate infrastructure development, improve governance, enhance human capital, foster economic diversification, and strengthen regional and global influence. Coordinated, context-sensitive, and long-term engagement is key to translating diplomatic and development initiatives into sustainable socio-economic transformation (Hurrell, 2006; Cooper, 2011; Acharya, 2014; Fawcett, 2015; Dowden, 2008).
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