Globalization is undergoing a profound structural transformation driven by rapid digital innovation and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. The international financial system, particularly the global payment architecture, has emerged as a key arena through which states and private actors seek to exercise political and economic influence. As money forms the foundation of payment systems, competing initiatives involving cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and central bank digital currencies are reshaping the governance of cross-border finance and raising important questions about monetary sovereignty. At the same time, countries are strengthening regional financial safety nets, developing bilateral payment connectivity, and promoting local currency settlement arrangements to reduce dependence on existing financial infrastructures dominated by Western economies. Competition over the international trade invoicing currency has consequently intensified as governments seek greater strategic autonomy and geopolitical leverage. Existing studies rely on SWIFT data to uncover the competition for the invoicing currency in global trade. But such studies will underrepresent the shifts in trade settlement currencies, particularly because they will not capture trade involving sanctioned countries. The article therefore draws on information reported by PBOC on the share of Chinese Yuan used in cross-border goods trade as a proxy to capture the shifts. It then argues that meaningful erosion of dollar dominance will require not only political commitment but also the development of deeper financial markets, correspondent banking networks, trade finance, and foreign exchange hedging infrastructure in alternative currencies. These developments present both opportunities and some challenges for the future evolution of the global financial system.
| Published in | International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 14, Issue 4) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ijefm.20261404.12 |
| Page(s) | 263-272 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2026. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Digital Currencies, Payment Systems, Correspondent Banking, Geopolitics, Trade Invoicing
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APA Style
Ramaswamy, S. (2026). Exercising Geopolitical Influence Through the Financial System. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 14(4), 263-272. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20261404.12
ACS Style
Ramaswamy, S. Exercising Geopolitical Influence Through the Financial System. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2026, 14(4), 263-272. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20261404.12
AMA Style
Ramaswamy S. Exercising Geopolitical Influence Through the Financial System. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2026;14(4):263-272. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20261404.12
@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20261404.12,
author = {Srichander Ramaswamy},
title = {Exercising Geopolitical Influence Through the Financial System},
journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences},
volume = {14},
number = {4},
pages = {263-272},
doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20261404.12},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20261404.12},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20261404.12},
abstract = {Globalization is undergoing a profound structural transformation driven by rapid digital innovation and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. The international financial system, particularly the global payment architecture, has emerged as a key arena through which states and private actors seek to exercise political and economic influence. As money forms the foundation of payment systems, competing initiatives involving cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and central bank digital currencies are reshaping the governance of cross-border finance and raising important questions about monetary sovereignty. At the same time, countries are strengthening regional financial safety nets, developing bilateral payment connectivity, and promoting local currency settlement arrangements to reduce dependence on existing financial infrastructures dominated by Western economies. Competition over the international trade invoicing currency has consequently intensified as governments seek greater strategic autonomy and geopolitical leverage. Existing studies rely on SWIFT data to uncover the competition for the invoicing currency in global trade. But such studies will underrepresent the shifts in trade settlement currencies, particularly because they will not capture trade involving sanctioned countries. The article therefore draws on information reported by PBOC on the share of Chinese Yuan used in cross-border goods trade as a proxy to capture the shifts. It then argues that meaningful erosion of dollar dominance will require not only political commitment but also the development of deeper financial markets, correspondent banking networks, trade finance, and foreign exchange hedging infrastructure in alternative currencies. These developments present both opportunities and some challenges for the future evolution of the global financial system.},
year = {2026}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - Exercising Geopolitical Influence Through the Financial System AU - Srichander Ramaswamy Y1 - 2026/07/17 PY - 2026 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20261404.12 DO - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20261404.12 T2 - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences JF - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences JO - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences SP - 263 EP - 272 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2326-9561 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20261404.12 AB - Globalization is undergoing a profound structural transformation driven by rapid digital innovation and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. The international financial system, particularly the global payment architecture, has emerged as a key arena through which states and private actors seek to exercise political and economic influence. As money forms the foundation of payment systems, competing initiatives involving cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and central bank digital currencies are reshaping the governance of cross-border finance and raising important questions about monetary sovereignty. At the same time, countries are strengthening regional financial safety nets, developing bilateral payment connectivity, and promoting local currency settlement arrangements to reduce dependence on existing financial infrastructures dominated by Western economies. Competition over the international trade invoicing currency has consequently intensified as governments seek greater strategic autonomy and geopolitical leverage. Existing studies rely on SWIFT data to uncover the competition for the invoicing currency in global trade. But such studies will underrepresent the shifts in trade settlement currencies, particularly because they will not capture trade involving sanctioned countries. The article therefore draws on information reported by PBOC on the share of Chinese Yuan used in cross-border goods trade as a proxy to capture the shifts. It then argues that meaningful erosion of dollar dominance will require not only political commitment but also the development of deeper financial markets, correspondent banking networks, trade finance, and foreign exchange hedging infrastructure in alternative currencies. These developments present both opportunities and some challenges for the future evolution of the global financial system. VL - 14 IS - 4 ER -